Personal identity is one of the most preeminent aspects of the self that both fascinates and confounds the populace in equal measure. What makes up my identity, and perhaps even further what makes me who I am. From the view of John Locke, it can be inferred that what I am is a “thinking, reasoning, self-conscious being”, otherwise known as a person.
But this does not inherently answer the question of identity, as this question goes further than a sense of what I am in my current state. To understand identity is to have a better understanding of our place and purpose, in both respects to ourselves and the wider world, and to perceive with greater clarity the many intricate interpersonal relationships we have both with ourselves through our existence and with those around us in time.
In general, questions of identity pertaining to the identification of persons, or us conscious or cognizant beings. From the perspective of identity regarding self, it is explored the concept of not only self in the present sense but also in regard to the hypothetical. In the event of a being existing in two places as two separate persons, indifferent only in physical composition but shared in sense of psychology, then these two are connected in the sense of qualitative identity, the idea that they are “exactly similar” apart from being two separate beings.
From this, the idea that these two cannot truly be one identity due to their separated physical existence of self brings the concept of numerical identity, in that these two are not numerically identical as they are two separate beings. Upon applying the concept of both qualitative and numerical identity to the existence of one person linearly through time, the question of what identity means regarding one’s existence becomes even more muddled.
This is in the idea that upon taking the same person from different points in time, said person(s) are not qualitatively identical due to their differing psychologies. At the same time, the person is numerically identical in that they are intrinsically the same individual regardless of differing minds. Essentially, it can be gleaned from this that we “continue to exist through time” regardless of other factors. Our case of identity may vary, but our continued existence on the linear timeline is undeniable.
From this continued existence, the Persistence Question is unveiled. The Persistence question is essentially the attempt to answer how we continue to exist through time. From the question of identity, the question of what must happen for “a person to continue to exist through physical and mental changes” is imminent.
One theory to explain this overarching question is the Soul Theory. This theory is based upon the foundation of cartesian dualism, inherently built with the belief that the continued existence of self through time is only reliant upon the immaterial soul. This non-extended, thinking thing is what possesses one’s psychology, insofar that the existence of the soul is the continued existence of identity.
In this view, the material body is separated from identity via not having any relation with it. The soul is the foundation of self, in that the reason a person is the same identity through time is that they are still the same soul. Essentially, to believe in the soul theory is to believe in the immortality of the soul, or better yet, the immortality of identity.
This is altogether a flawed theory, arguably dated in both its claims and even the central foundation for the argument. Some issues with the soul theory are brought to light by John Locke’s fictional case of the Prince and the Cobbler. In this theoretical example, Locke presents the case that these two individuals have their entire psychologies switched, with the soul and body remaining united. Essentially, the psychology of the prince is united with the soul and body of the cobbler, and vice versa.
Essentially, the question that needs to be answered from this hypothetical case is, who is who? To do this, a case is presented in which the prince, prior to this psychological switch, has committed a crime. Despite the psychology of the cobbler living in the body of the original person who committed the crime, Locke argues that the cobbler’s body is who should be punished, as it possesses the mind that originally set out to commit said crime.
By this thinking, the identity of the person who committed the crime currently is only dependent on where the psychology resides. In the view of Locke, the psychology that inhabits the body defines that person, in that the psychology is tied to identity while the soul and body are separated from identity. From this, it can be inferred that the soul is unrelated to identity, in that identity is not reliant on the hypothetical, immaterial soul.
I believe that while this hypothetical example serves as a vague foundation to prop up this central argument against the soul theory, it is successful in arguing its claim to an extent. Certain weaknesses in the argument are the idea that the soul inherently remains with the body during this psychological switch, ignoring that in such hypothetical scenarios there is no basis to assume the soul is tied to the body any more than the psychology.
To assume the soul inherently stays with the body is in a way flawed, and to an extent undermines the very belief of the cartesian dualism it is arguing against (in that the soul is unrelated to the body and capable of existing beyond material death of the physical body).
Why the soul of the prince would not travel with the psychology of the prince to the cobbler’s body is never deeply examined, and to question this aspect of the claim is to undermine the argument in its entirety. But should this factor of the soul-body union be accepted, then the findings that fight against the soul theory are founded.
